Iran’s ability to hold its ground against the United States is, in itself, a notable accomplishment.
As a fragile ceasefire continues between the United States and Iran, concerns are mounting over the conflict’s long-term impact and whether its key objectives were truly met. While the war may have weakened Iran militarily, uncertainties persist regarding its strategic outcomes and the wider implications for regional stability.
In an exclusive interview with India Today, former Israeli Deputy National Security Adviser Chuck Freilich offered his assessment of the conflict, the ceasefire, and the evolving geopolitical landscape, including Pakistan’s role and the future of key maritime chokepoints.
Q: Given your experience within Israel’s security establishment, you recently wrote that this could be a military success but a strategic failure. What did you mean by that?
Chuck Freilich: There is little doubt that Iran’s military capabilities have been significantly weakened, which can be seen as a clear military success. However, the core objectives at the outset of the war – regime change, ending Iran’s nuclear programme, or at the very least substantially curbing its missile capabilities – have not been achieved.
Moreover, Iran has emerged from the conflict, at least for now, still capable of disrupting Gulf shipping routes, a move that could trigger a global financial and oil crisis. Through its ten-point plan, it appears to be retaining that option for the future, making the current ceasefire a fragile and uncertain arrangement.
Q: With a ceasefire now in place, Pakistan selected as the venue, and talks expected to begin, do you think the ceasefire will hold?
Chuck Freilich: That is an important question. I believe the ceasefire is likely to hold for the next couple of weeks, as both the United States and Iran have a strong interest in avoiding a renewed conflict. There is a reasonable chance it could continue beyond that.
However, the likelihood of it evolving into a formal agreement – or even a permanent ceasefire, let alone a full peace deal – is much lower. The most probable scenario is that tensions gradually ease, leading to a de facto ceasefire without any official agreement, with neither side actively resuming hostilities.
For Iran, simply withstanding a confrontation with the United States is, in itself, a significant achievement.
Q: Given your experience as a former Deputy National Security Adviser, how do you assess Pakistan’s role in mediating between the United States and Iran? With the ceasefire being described as “two-sided,” implying Israel must also hold fire, what are the stakes for Israel, and have they been adequately considered?
Chuck Freilich: I’m not certain that Israel was meaningfully consulted on this. It appears to have been largely a US-driven initiative, with broader implications for Washington’s relations with other countries rather than for Israel. Since Israel does not maintain ties with Pakistan, the development is of limited direct relevance to it. The United States seemed to be seeking any credible intermediary to facilitate a diplomatic outcome, and Pakistan stepped in alongside Egypt and Turkey.
Q: The focus appears to have shifted – from regime change to reopening the Strait of Hormuz. How do you see the situation unfolding?
Chuck Freilich: At present, Iran is asserting its right to impose transit fees on ships passing through the Strait as part of the ceasefire arrangement. During the conflict, the Strait remained accessible for Iranian shipping, particularly exports to China, which buys the bulk of Iran’s oil. Now, while Iran has agreed to reopen it to global shipping, it is demanding payment.
This position has no grounding in international law, as the Strait is considered an international waterway. If such a demand were accepted, it would mark a significant win for Iran, providing substantial revenue to rebuild its military and support its economy. Ideally, this should not be included in any final agreement.
Q: You’ve described the objectives as unrealistic. Why do you think so?
Chuck Freilich: I don’t believe either the United States or Israel engaged in sufficient planning. The strategy seems to have been partial and built on overly optimistic assumptions. Iran had already been weakened by earlier conflicts, and there was an expectation that internal unrest could trigger regime change. While this explains the timing and urgency, it also points to gaps in deeper strategic and operational planning.
Q: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had long pushed for such an operation against Iran. Do you question the approach, and where does he stand politically now?
Chuck Freilich: I believe he will face political challenges. Even before the war, opinion polls indicated he might struggle to form a government after the next elections. He may have hoped a successful operation would boost his standing, but the outcome has not been particularly favourable. As a result, he is likely to remain under considerable political pressure.
Q: How do you assess Israel’s engagement on multiple fronts, including Gaza, Iran, and Lebanon?
Chuck Freilich: From a military standpoint, Israel’s position is far stronger than it was two and a half years ago. Hamas has been weakened, Hezbollah has been significantly degraded, and Iran has also taken a hit.
However, from a strategic perspective, the picture is less encouraging. Hamas still exists, Hezbollah remains active, and many of the broader objectives have yet to be fully achieved.
Q: Analysts argue that despite military gains, Iran remains intact and may even feel emboldened. How should Israel respond to this?
Chuck Freilich: The conflict is far from over. While there have been improvements on the military front, this does not amount to a decisive victory. It is part of a prolonged confrontation between Israel and Iran. For Israel, this issue remains central and will continue to shape its long-term strategic priorities.
Q: Some experts believe that control over key maritime chokepoints like Hormuz and Bab el-Mandab gives Iran leverage comparable to nuclear capability. Do you agree?
Chuck Freilich: That is certainly one perspective. Iran has previously demonstrated how effectively it can use influence over these maritime routes. Any disruption in such chokepoints can have far-reaching global consequences. It is somewhat surprising that this aspect may not have been fully factored into the recent conflict, and it is likely to receive greater attention going forward.